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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction under U.C. A. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) and 
transferred the case to the Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §78A-4-103(2)(j). 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR RULES 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as cited by Plaintiff in her brief 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Appeal 
Plaintiffs personal injury lawsuit for alleged injuries sustained in a car accident was 
dismissed upon defendant's motion due to plaintiffs failure to properly prosecute her 
lawsuit. The trial court then denied plaintiffs motion to set aside the dismissal of her case 
after plaintiff failed to timely appear for oral argument on said motion. In support of its 
denial of the motion to set aside under Rule 60(b), the court issued a seven page order 
containing its findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
Plaintiff filed her complaint on November 15, 2006 for injuries allegedly sustained 
in a car accident on December 3, 2002. From the beginning, plaintiff failed to comply with 
the case's deadlines or to produce documents in response to defendants' numerous requests. 
Ultimately, on November 5, 2007 defendants filed a motion for summary judgment due to 
plaintiffs failure to produce evidence supporting her claims for injuries. (R. at p. 48). 
1 
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Plaintiff opposed the motion and swore in affidavit, that the delay in the case to that point 
was due to her inaction on account of her father taking ill and passing away and some tax 
issue never fully explained. (R. at p. 73). 
The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment but admonished plaintiff that 
"plaintiffs conduct in pursuit of her own lawsuit has been dilatory and often in derogation 
of the scheduling order." (R. at pp. 100-104). The court further pointed out that "this is, 
after all, [plaintiff's] lawsuit and that defendants also no doubt find it extremely inconvenient 
to be sued." Id. emphasis in original. Accordingly, the court granted an award of 
defendants' attorney's fees in the amount of $1,372.50 for the motion. (R. at p. 114). 
Plaintiff has never paid this sanction. 
In the wake of the order granting sanctions, plaintiff finally provided her medical 
records, however failed to produce her medical bills with those records. The parties also met 
and executed an Amended Case Management Order under which fact discovery would be 
completed by July 1,2008, expert discovery by October 30,2008 and trial would be set by 
December 1, 2008. (R. at p. 118). 
For their part, defendants complied with the management order. On January 15,2008, 
defendants sent subpoenas to all of plaintiff s care providers. On March 8,2008, defendant 
subpoenaed records of all of plaintiff s recent employers. On March 18,2008, defendants 
deposed plaintiff. Per the expert discovery deadlines, on September 19, 2008, defendants 
2 
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designated an expert. Throughout this time, plaintiff did nothing of substance to move her 
case forward. (R. at p. 124-130). 
After months of silence from plaintiff, on June 1, 2009, defendants made one final 
significant settlement offer to plaintiffs which was open until June 10,2009. (R, at p. 163). 
When no response was received by the settlement offer deadline, defendants filed a motion 
to dismiss on June 29, 2009. (R. at p. 164). Plaintiff failed to respond to the motion to 
dismiss and the court granted the motion on August 13, 2009. (R. at p. 177). 
To this point in the litigation, all correspondence from plaintiff was through Mark (not 
Matthew Graff) and all of plaintiff s filings were signed by Mark Graff On September 3, 
2009, through new counsel, plaintiff filed her Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and 
Request for Hearing.1 (R. at p. 181). 
A hearing was granted, but when plaintiff failed to timely appear, the trial court 
upheld the dismissal with prejudice. (R. at p. 291). Plaintiff then filed a Second Motion to 
Set Aside Order of Dismissal on March 24, 2010. (R. at p. 292). The trial court denied 
plaintiffs second motion and issued a seven page order containing the court's finding of 
facts and conclusions of law. (R. at p. 332). 
1
 Plaintiff labeled her motion as setting aside a default judgment, however the relief 
sought was to set aside the court's order of dismissal. The court clarified this fact in its 
Order dated June 4, 2010. (R. at p. 332). 
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C The Court's Order 
In its June 4,2010 order (the "Order"), attached as Addendum I, the trial court clearly 
states that it dismissed plaintiffs lawsuit due to lack of prosecution. (R. at p. 334). Using 
its discretion under Rule 41 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Order dismisses plaintiffs 
case and addresses each issue raised by plaintiff in this appeal. 
The Order first addresses plaintiffs arguments relating to Matthew Graff and the 
requirement of a Notice to Appear or Appoint under Rule 74, U.R.C.P. The Order explains 
that although plaintiff was not served well by Matthew Graffs involvement, the court 
reviewed the pleadings in the case and found them to be signed by Mark Graff, who has had 
no disciplinary proceedings against him. (R. at p. 333). The trial court stated: 
Plaintiffs argument is unavailing because Mark Graff has at no time been 
suspended, disbarred, or removed from the case. The pleadings and other 
documents show Mark, not Matthew, Graff to have been principally involved 
in this case. The undisputed unprofessional conduct on the part of Matthew 
Graff in other matters does not automatically disqualify Mark Graff from 
acting in this matter, and the Court can identify no rule that holds Mark Graff 
should be considered to have been disqualified by association. Defendants 
therefore had no duty to serve a notice that was not required by the rule. 
(R. at p. 334, emphasis in original). 
Similarly, the trial court's Order provides a lengthy explanation of its basis for 
dismissing plaintiffs case pursuant to Rule 41(b), U.R.C.P., including supporting case law. 
The Order starts by pointing out that "(f)rom the outset, the progress of this case has been 
slow and halting" which caused the court to impose sanctions on plaintiff for her "dilatory 
4 
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discovery conduct" and that "Plaintiffs side has done very little to forward the case since 
that time." (R. at p. 332). The Order further states "the Court finds that (plaintiffs) response 
to her counsel's conduct was not reasonably diligent, that her opportunity of advancing the 
case was equal to or greater than Defendants', and that she has in fact done a great deal less 
than Defendants have to advance this matter." (R. at p. 335). The court finally points out 
that "no dereliction on the part of the Graff firm explains Plaintiffs failure to appear at the 
March 3, 2010 hearing" in which the court was to hold oral argument on plaintiffs motion 
to set aside. (R. at p. 335). 
The Order closes by addressing if plaintiff has shown "sufficient diligence" for relief 
under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Applying the four factors laid out in 
Cheap-O-Rooter, Inc. v. Marmalade Square Condo. Homeowners Ass 'n, 2009 UT App 329, 
221 P.3d 898, the trial court stated "although the Court determines that Plaintiff has not acted 
in bad faith, the danger of prejudice to Defendants is great and the length of delay has been 
both unwarranted and disruptive of the judicial process." (R. at pp. 336-337). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's denial of her motion pursuant to Rule 60(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, to set aside the dismissal of her case. In denying plaintiffs request 
for relief, the trial court issued the seven page Order setting forth its findings of facts and 
conclusions of law. Plaintiffs statements that "there is simply nothing on the record to 
5 
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indicate what evidence the district court relied on or the legal basis for its denial of 
Harrison's Rule 60(b) motion1' (Appellant's Brief at p. 18) or that "the district court's denial 
of Harrison's Rule 60(b) Motion is devoid of any explanation" (Appellant's Brief at p. 24) 
are simply incorrect. 
The trial court correctly and thoughtfully weighed all the facts and factors of this case 
and properly dismissed plaintiffs lawsuit due to her lack of diligence in prosecuting her 
claims. The dismissal should be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL IS WELL DOCUMENTED AND 
SUFFICIENT. 
The first issue raised by plaintiff is the argument that the denial of her motion to set 
aside is "legally deficient" without facts to support the dismissal The dismissal of an action 
for plaintiffs failure to prosecute is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not 
be upset absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 765 (Utah 
1980). 
In this case, the trial court thoughtfully and exhaustively laid out the facts of the 
proceedings it took into consideration when it reached its decision to dismiss. The trial court 
correctly showed the lengthy and continual dilatory manner in which plaintiff has failed to 
prosecute her case. The trial court weighed the following factors: (1) the conduct of both 
parties; (2) the opportunity each party has had to move the case forward; (3) what each party 
6 
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has done to move the case forward; (4) the amount of difficulty or prejudice that may have 
been caused to defendants; and (5) most important, whether injustice may result from the 
dismissal. Gillmor v. Blue Ledge Corp., 2009 UT App 320. (R. at pp. 334-335). Upon 
weighing these factors, the trial court correctly dismissed plaintiffs lawsuit. 
The trial court pointed out plaintiffs dilatory manner in prosecuting her case. It 
factored in the previous sanction imposed against plaintiff for her failure to participate in the 
case. Although plaintiffs brief seeks to blame Matthew Graff for her failure to prosecute 
the case, at the time the trial court imposed sanctions, plaintiff filed her affidavit specifically 
avowing that the delay was her fault due to her father's passing and a "tax issue". Despite 
the sanction, plaintiff was given "a * second chance5 to pursue her case but has accomplished 
very little toward doing so." (R. at p. 336). 
Finally, the trial court attempted to give plaintiff a third chance at her lawsuit by 
scheduling oral argument to discuss plaintiffs motion to set aside. Plaintiff failed to take 
advantage of her third chance by failing to timely appear for the oral argument. In short, 
plaintiff has had eight years since the accident and four years since the filing of her complaint 
to move this case forward and has failed to do so. The trial court graciously permitted 
plaintiff three chances to reclaim control of her case and each time plaintiff failed to do so. 
Because the trial court fully explained the basis of its decision to dismiss, it has not 
abused its discretion and the trial courf s dismissal must not be upset. 
7 
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II. MARK GRAFF, NOT MATTHEW GRAFF, WAS PLAINTIFF'S 
COUNSEL, THEREFORE NO NOTICE TO APPEAR OR APPOINT 
WAS REQUIRED. 
Plaintiffs second issue presented on appeal is that no Notice to Appear or Appoint 
was filed pursuant to Rule 74, U.R.C.P. upon Matthew Graffs suspension from the practice 
of law. Despite plaintiff counsel's "affidavit" of what defendants and their counsel knew, 
defendants were not aware of the suspension that was handed down just 12 business days 
before they filed their motion to dismiss. In fact, the motion to dismiss was filed in response 
to the unanswered settlement offer sent by defendants to plaintiff on June 1, 2009 (which, 
in retrospect, was sent prior to Matthew Graffs suspension). Because plaintiff had not 
prosecuted her case for quite some time, one final settlement offer was made. When that 
offer went unanswered for 2 weeks, defendants filed the motion to dismiss. Defendants were 
not aware that Matthew Graff had been suspended in the time between the settlement offer 
and the motion for dismissal. 
Moreover, as pointed out by the trial court's Order, the suspension of Matthew Graff 
is irrelevant because he was not plaintiffs primary counsel; Mark Graff was. A quick review 
of the court's file shows that every pleading filed on plaintiffs behalf is signed and filed by 
Mark Graff. Additionally, with the exception of one deposition, all of defense counsel's 
communications in this case were with Mark Graff, not Matthew Graff. 
8 
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Rule 74(c) states that counsel must serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint when an 
attorney dies, is suspended, disbarred or removed from the case. Despite Matthew Graffs 
personal problems, the trial court correctly pointed out "Mark Graff has at no time been 
suspended, disbarred, or removed from the case." (R. at p. 334). Because Mark Graff was 
plaintiffs attorney and because Mark Graff was not suspended or disbarred, defendants were 
not required to file a Notice to Appear or Appoint. 
Because the trial court found "Defendants therefore had no duty to serve a notice that 
was not required by the rule", it was within the trial court's discretion to dismiss plaintiffs 
case pursuant to Rule 41 and deny relief under Rule 60(b). Because the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion, the dismissal must stand. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court dismissed plaintiffs lawsuit due to her failure to prosecute her claims. 
Despite having been given three chances to push her case forward, plaintiff failed to do so. 
After four years of dilatory conduct, the trial court granted dismissal. When plaintiff sought 
to set aside the dismissal, she failed to timely appear for oral argument. Accordingly, the trial 
court issued a seven page Order explaining the basis of its decision for upholding the 
dismissal. Plaintiffs appeal fails to show the trial court abused its discretion, particularly in 
light of the seven page Order. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, its 
dismissal should not be upset. 
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DATED this day of December, 2010. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
GREGORY J. SANDERS 
PATRICK C. BURT 
Attorneys for Appellees/Defendants 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT Y 




TIFFANY THURSTON, et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING "PLAINTIFF'S 
SECOND MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL" 
Case No. 060502164 
Judge Eric A. Ludlow 
Before the Court is "Plaintiff s Second Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal." Having 
considered the motion, memoranda, and other materials filed by the parties, the Court denies the 
motion for the reasons discussed below. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
From the outset, the progress of this case has been slow and halting. On January 9, 2008, 
the Court entered an order imposing sanctions on Plaintiff for dilatory discovery conduct. 
Despite the clear direction of the Court, Plaintiffs side has done very little to forward the case 
since that time. In response to the order, Plaintiff finally provided her medical records and her 
deposition was taken; however, she did not (1) produce the requested medical bills and 
breakdown of medical expenses, (2) meet the deadlines of the amended scheduling order for 
designating expert witnesses, or (3) respond to Defendants' efforts to settle this matter. 
Plaintiff lays the blame for her failure to prosecute this matter entirely at the feet of her 
A-1 J3Z-
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former counsel. Matthew T. Graff was suspended from the practice of law on June 9, 2009, and 
a trustee was appointed to handle his remaining caseload. There is no doubt that Plaintiff was 
not served well by Matthew Graffs involvement, whatever it was, in this matter. However, a 
review of the documents in the Court's file reveals that the complaint was filed and signed by 
Mark K Graff, not Matthew T. Graff. Furthermore, Mark Graffs signature (or what purports to 
be his signature) appears on the stipulated scheduling order, the amended case management 
order, Plaintiffs initial disclosures, the memorandum in opposition to summary judgment, and 
various correspondence between counsel. The Court has not been made aware of any 
disciplinary proceeding against Mark Graff. 
The Court granted Defendants' unopposed motion to dismiss for Plaintiffs failure to 
prosecute on August 13, 2009. Thereafter, Plaintiffs new counsel filed a "Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment" on September 3,2009, to which Defendants responded with a memorandum 
in opposition. Though the relief the motion seeks is technically unavailable- no default 
judgment has in fact been entered in this matter- the Court granted Plaintiffs request for a 
hearing on the motion. After neither Plaintiff nor new counsel appeared for the hearing 
scheduled for March 4, 2010, the Court entered an order of dismissal. Later Plaintiff filed the 
instant motion. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. Rule 74 
Plaintiff argues that the fact that she received no Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel 
makes the dismissal inappropriate. Under Utah Rule of Procedure 74(c), 
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the case by the court, the opposing party shall serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint 
Counsel on the unrepresented party, informing the party of the responsibility to appear 
personally or appoint counsel. A copy of the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel must 
be filed with the court. No further proceedings shall be held in the case until 20 days after 
filing the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel unless the unrepresented party waives the 
time requirement or unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
Plaintiffs argument is unavailing because Mark Graff has at no time been suspended, disbarred, 
or removed from the case. The pleadings and other documents show Mark, not Matthew, Graff 
to have been principally involved in this case. The undisputed unprofessional conduct on the 
part of Matthew Graff in other matters does not automatically disqualify Mark Graff from acting 
in this matter, and the Court can identify no rule that holds Mark Graff should be considered to 
have been disqualified by association. Defendants therefore had no duty to serve a notice that 
was not required by the rule. 
B. Rule 41(b) 
This matter was dismissed for lack of prosecution, not, as Plaintiff has sometimes argued, 
under the standards applicable to default judgment. "It is well established that under Rule 41(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial court has the discretion to dismiss an action with 
prejudice for failure to prosecute without justifiable excuse.1' Rohan v. Boseman, 2002 UT App 
109, H 28 (citing Maxfieldv. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). "The party 
challenging the dismissal bears the burden of offering a reasonable excuse for [his or her] lack of 
diligence." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted; alteration in original). In making this 
determination, the Court examines: 
(1) the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each party has had to move the case 
forward; (3) what each party has done to move the case forward; (4) the amount of 
difficulty or prejudice that may have been caused to the other side; and (5) most 




Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Gillmor v. Blue Ledge Corp., 2009 UT App 230, [^ 31 (quoting Country Meadows Convalescent 
Or. v. Utah Dep't of Health, 851 P.2d 1212, 1215 (Utah Ct App. 1993)). 
Reviewing the facts in this matter, the Court finds that Ms. Harrison's response to her 
counsel's conduct was not reasonably diligent, that her opportunity of advancing the case was 
equal to or greater than Defendants', and that she has in fact done a great deal less than 
Defendants have to advance this matter. Citing telephone records showing the number of calls 
she made over the course of several years to the Graff office, Plaintiff argues that she was as 
diligent as she could be. She avers that she received "no response to the vast majority of [her] 
phone calls and it was virtually impossible to find out about the status of [her] case from Mr. 
Graffs office." Affidavit of Ember Harrison at *§ 4. Although the Court finds the negligent 
conduct alleged on the part of former counsel to be extremely troubling, it must be noted that 
"virtually impossible" is not the same thing as "impossible," and that Mr. Graff's office was not 
the only source of information available to Ms. Harrison. Additionally, the lack of response to so 
many calls over so long a period- particularly after sanctions had already been awarded because 
of the lack of progress in discovery- should have at least put Plaintiff on notice that something 
was amiss. Nothing in Ms. Harrison's affidavit indicates that these phone contacts should have 
given her the false sense of security that her case was being attended to competently; rather, the 
Court finds it more likely that these circumstances should have led a person seriously interested 
in pursuing legal action to conclude the very opposite and to make inquiries from alternate 
sources. Further, no dereliction on the part of the Graff firm explains Plaintiffs failure to appear 
at the March 3,2010 hearing. 
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contributes to the risk of loss of witnesses' memories and physical evidence. Moreover, as 
shown by the procedural history recited above, Defendants have been put to considerable trouble 
and expense in this matter. Ms. Harrison has had a "second chance" to pursue her case but has 
accomplished very little toward doing so. "Even where a trial court finds facts indicating that 
'injustice could result from the dismissal of [a] case,' it can dismiss when a plaintiff has 'had 
more than ample opportunity to prove his [or her] asserted interest and simply failed to do so/'5 
Country Meadows, 851 P.2d at 1216 (quoting Maxfieldv. Rushton, 779 P.2d at 240 (Utah App. 
1989) (alterations in original)). "Such nonaction is inexcusable, not only from the standpoint of 
the parties, but also because it constitutes abuse of the judicial process." Maxfield, 779 P.2d at 
240-41. 
C. Rule 60(b) 
Finally, Plaintiff argues that her conduct amounts to "excusable neglect" under Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 60(b). "[I]n deciding whether a party is entitled to relief under rule 60(b) on 
the ground of excusable neglect, a district court must determine whether the moving party has 
exercised sufficient diligence that it would be equitable to grant him relief from the judgment 
entered as a result of his neglect." Jones v. Layton/Okland, 2009 UT 39, \ 25. The test for 
"sufficient diligence" is analytically similar to the "reasonable excuse" inquiry under Rule 41: 
Four factors are relevant to the inquiry: "[i] the danger of prejudice to [the nonmoving 
party], [ii] the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, [iii] the 
reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the 
movant, and [iv] whether the movant acted in good faith." 
Cheap-O-Rooter, Inc. v. Marmalade Square Condo, Homeowners Ass'n, 2009 UT App 329, \ 12 
(quoting West v. Grand County, 942 P.2d 337,340-41 (Utah 1997)). For the reasons more fully 
5 
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discussed above, the Court does not find that Plaintiff's actions have been sufficiently diligent to 
invoke equity in this matter. Further, although the Court determines that Plaintiff has not acted 
in bad faith, the danger of prejudice to Defendants is great and the length of delay has been both 
unwarranted and disruptive of the judicial process. 
"Plaintiffs Second Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal" is therefore DENIED. 
Dated this 
& 
Ige Eric A. Ludlow 
Fifth District Court 
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copy in such attorney's file in the Clerk's Office at the Fifth District Courthouse in St. George, 
Utah and/or by placing a copy in the United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, and 
addressed as follows: 
Aaron J. Prisbrey 
Elizabeth B. Grimshaw 
AARON J. Prisbrey, P.C. 
1090 East Tabernacle Street 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Gregory J. Sanders 
Patrick C. Burt 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, PC 
10 Exchange Place, 4lh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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